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entirely true, as Eberhard maintained, that the Leibnitians had definitely distinguished synthetic from analytic *a priori* judgments, though in other terms. (2) Kant's formulations of this distinction did not clarify but profoundly obscured it; for they involved a neglect of the difference between the psychological and the logical sense of 'synthetic,' and were ambiguous with respect to the fundamental question whether anything more than tautological propositions can be justified by the "principle of contradiction." (3) Kant's question, "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" was a logical absurdity in so far as it meant "How can their validity be established?" The only conceivable evidence of the validity of an *a priori* judgment is its self-evidence, its necessity, or its deducibility from some immediately necessary judgment. Necessity, once granted, may prove the judgment's apriority; but apriority cannot be antecedently established as a proof of necessity. Kant himself betrays this simple truth in the notorious piece of circular reasoning wherein he infers from the necessity of mathematical judgments that apriority of the pure percepts which is to ground the legitimacy of the mathematical judgments. When, therefore, Eberhard remarked that what is known to be true does not stand in need of a prior inquiry into its possibility, he plunged a pointed truism to the very heart of Kant's pretension to have discovered a radically new method in philosophy, unknown to his "dogmatic" predecessors.

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History of Ethics within Organized Christianity. By THOMAS CUMING HALL. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.—pp. xi, 605.

"Strangely enough," says Dr. Hall in his Introduction, "the history of Christian ethics has had no adequate treatment by an English-writing student." The use of the term "adequate" suggests at once two conceptions of the task of a history of Christian ethics. If the historian conceives his duty to be that of stating as clearly and accurately as may be the ethical conceptions and doctrines of the various writers who have been most closely associated with organized Christianity, it is possible to speak with some propriety of an "adequate treatment." But if one attempts rather to single out what is most distinctive in Christian ethics, to compare this with other ethical systems, and then to explain the same, it is obvious why there has been no adequate treatment hitherto, and also that no treatment in the immediate future, is likely to maintain long any claim to adequacy. "Christian" ethics is, among other things (1) the ethics of an organized community, (2) the ethics of a religion, (3) the ethics of a religion which at its beginning stood in peculiar relations to

certain existing religions and civilizations, (4) the ethics of a religious and political body which transmitted the order and values of an older civilization to peoples possessing great vitality but only a slightly developed system of conceptions either for comprehending nature or for controlling and valuing life, (5) the ethics of a religious community recruited at various periods from different social and economic classes, the poor, the powerful, the middle class. Now the conceptual apparatus, as well as the concrete facts, for explaining most of these aspects of Christian ethics has only begun to be available. Social psychology, comparative religion, anthropology, folk-psychology, have come in to supplement the older methods of logical analysis, and various writers will apply these with varying emphasis to the historical task.

The present work is to a considerable degree devoted to a statement of the positions of the various writers treated. To some it may seem that there is too little, to others it may seem that there is too much space, relatively, allotted to this general aim, or in particular, to this or that author. It might be questioned whether an allotment of twenty-eight pages to Luther, as against eighteen to Paul and eight to Augustine, was objectively justifiable, however one's sympathies might lie. But it would be unprofitable to discuss this. Suffice it to say on this side of Dr. Hall's work that it shows patient and sympathetic effort to gain from the sources the most significant doctrines and to make these accessible. In some cases the statement gives a somewhat scrappy effect, but this was perhaps inevitable unless the size of the work were to be unduly increased, or many less familiar authors omitted entirely.

The most valuable feature of the book is its consideration of the whole history of Christian ethics as this is affected by the rise and fall of authority in the Christian community. Although the author makes no effort to conceal his conviction as to the evil effects upon an ethical system of such a principle, and shows clearly his sympathy with the struggles against it, he does not treat it simply as a 'corruption' or 'perversion' of the simpler ethical teaching of Jesus. He exhibits the growth of the church organization as affected by the necessity of maintaining itself and defining its position as over against hostile groups or forces of disintegration. The social psychology of all group-life under such conditions is effectively introduced to explain the ethics of the early church. It found itself in a situation analogous to that of a modern trade union when fighting for existence. Private judgment, inner authority, is stamped as the attitude of a heretic or a scab. "The needs of an organization, whether in China or Japan, in England or Germany, will produce rules of conduct and habits of mind exactly resembling each other so far as the needs of the organiza-

tion happen to be the same." "The little Christian church meant to gather from the whole world a 'holy community' to prepare for the coming Utopia and to receive the master when he came." It had a practical program. It was looking forward with hope and longing to the era of social justice "when the possessionless working class would enter upon its rights, joys, and rewards." "The ethics of ecclesiasticism becomes a law to be imposed on others, rather than, as in the beginning, an autonomous regulation of each life by a common loving enthusiasm." "The compacting force of hostile attacks compelled it [the church] to adopt a special ethics and to consolidate its life and traditions."

In the successive chapters—Ethics of the Early Church, the old Catholic or Bishop's Church, The Militant Papacy, Scholasticism, The English Reformation, The Continental Reformation, and The Merging of Churchly with Philosophical Ethics—the central theme is the rise and decline of authority and the relation of this to the ethics of the periods thus defined. With the scholastic period another aspect of authority comes into greater prominence—the authority not only of the hierarchy but of the dogmas and traditions of the Fathers and the councils. Elements of the system were indeed derived from a great variety of sources—it was 'one vast convenient compromise.' The high religious and ethical ideals of Judaism, the fine and subtile intellectual and artistic exactitudes of Greece, the metaphysical systems of the Orient, with their pessimism and passivity—none of them could be taken over in its original purity. The hierarchy took what she needed for her purpose and gave it all the stamp of her divine authority. This, no doubt, served a useful pedagogical purpose. But "ethics on the basis of authority becomes a mere legal casuistry. Ethics was handed over to the confessional, and was dealt with in the distressing books of penitence, where the practical purpose of church discipline, of reformation of the sinner, and the preservation of the peace mingle with other and lower motives, as the exaltation of the clergy, the protection of property and class privileges, and the maintenance of a humble frame of mind among those whom the church governed."

The ethics of the Reformation likewise show the influences of authority under new forms. The contest between church and state was important in England. On the Continent Luther and Calvin show the conflicting forces of the old and the new but with a difference: "In the last analysis for Luther the soul must stand alone for truth, and trust that it will not be forsaken. In the last analysis for Calvin the soul finds out which church has the sacrament and the word and submits wholly to it. The difference is world-wide. For true ethical development there is no more room in logical Calvinism than in logical Romanism."

Dr. Hall has performed a highly important service in bringing out so clearly the influence of the conception of authority in Christian ethics, and it would be ungracious to complain that he has not at the same time given as much attention to several of the other possible lines of consideration suggested in the first paragraph of this notice as one might desire. One does not, for example, have a very definite impression as to whether there is anything which may fairly be called the Christian ethical ideal and, if there is one, how this differs from other ideals. Nor have comparative religion and anthropology been utilized to their full extent to throw light on some of the important motives and conceptions. For example, Christian ethics has conceived life largely under the imagery of sin and redemption, of sacramental grace and new birth. What is the real content of these conceptions? How far is their import affected by the medium of magic in which they arose? What have they meant at various periods to the people who expressed through them their ethical ideals? These and many other similar questions will demand an answer of the future writer who aims to understand the conceptions which still affect Christendom, even though the ethics of the present takes little account of them in its formal systems. It is to be hoped that Dr. Hall and others whom this excellent piece of work may stimulate will attempt further analyses with the improved methods now becoming available.

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The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi. By ANDREW HALLIDAY DOUGLAS. Edited by Charles Douglas and R. P. Hardie. Cambridge, University Press, 1910.—pp. x, 318.

Pietro Pomponazzi (Pomponatius), a name unfamiliar to the average student, has been sadly neglected even by scholars, although called the "most influential professor of philosophy of his age." The standard histories of philosophy treat of him perfunctorily. We learn from them that he was the leader of the Alexandrists against the Averroists, that he attacked the doctrine of St. Thomas regarding the soul as a substantial form independent of the body, that he denied the immortality of the individual soul, that he rationalized in various ways the popular notions of the supernatural, and that he reconciled all this with theological orthodoxy by the subterfuge of a "double truth," one for reason and one for faith. And all this, no doubt, is substantially correct as far as it goes. But so far we have had no complete account of his teachings in English based on a first-hand study of his works and exhibiting them in their proper historical setting. The Italians have given him some attention. Ferri, for example, has competently treated of his psychology; Renan,